ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a realistic model to investigate the cascading failure process in a cyber-physical power system (CPPS) which can be topologically modeled as an interdependent system consisting of a power network and a cyber-network. To evaluate the robustness of CPPS against cyber-attacks, we take into consideration the effects of computer malware spreading, power redistribution and overloading, and the interdependency between the coupled networks, and then adopt the stochastic failure model to calculate the time interval between the initial cyber-attack and a given level of power loss. We conduct a critical node analysis on the power network to identify the important buses whose removals are likely to trigger a serious blackout. Based on the results of the critical node analysis, we propose both deterministic and stochastic coupling strategies for an asymmetric CPPS with two subnetworks with unequal sizes, to improve its robustness against both random and intentional cyber-attacks. The simulation results on CPPSs built on IEEE 118 Bus and 300 Bus power systems indicate that the proposed coupling methods can effectively improve the system robustness against cyber-attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, a variety of critical physical systems are managed by a particular cyber system, and the whole system is usually referred to as a cyber-physical system (CPS) [1] , [2] . The term cyber-physical system was first introduced in the early 2000s and has attracted the attention of many research disciplines and application areas since. As a typical cyber-physical system, a smart grid can be regarded as a cyber-physical power system (CPPS), which is a combination of a physical power system containing power apparatuses and a cyber system for monitoring, control, and communications of the physical part.
The introduction of a cyber layer makes modern smart grids more intelligent and efficient, but meanwhile brings unprecedented risks of cyber attacks. Nowadays, computers are in control of various power apparatus in the power grids and the integration with the Internet exposes new risks of unauthorized access to the grids. Therefore, cyber attacks by spreading computer malware may cause severe damages to the whole cyber-physical power system.
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For example, on December 23rd, 2015, a synchronized cyber-attack targeting at three Ukrainian power distribution companies affected hundreds of thousands of residents around Kiev for six hours [3] . Two types of computer malware (BlackEnergy 3 and KillDisk) penetrated the cyber layer controlling the Ukrainian power grid through an infected file downloaded by the grid operator and then jointly neutralized the power system. Shortly after a year on December 17th 2016, another cyber attack was launched on the Ukrainian power system, seriously affecting the daily life of the citizens and causing considerable economic loss. Frequent malicious cyber attacks on power grids and their catastrophic consequences imply that understanding the cyber-security of smart grids has already become a critical and urgent task [4] .
Complex network has been widely considered as an effective tool to analyze the modeling, dynamics, and robustness of many networked systems. In many kinds of complex networks, malfunctioning of one or a few components may trigger successive failures across the whole system, and such a process is referred to as cascading failures. A wealth of prior work was devoted to the cascading failure analysis of complex networks [5] - [8] . Particularly for power systems, Stott et al. [9] proposed a DC power flow model to derive the voltage and current information of the electrical components by solving a series of nonlinear equations, providing a balance between computational complexity and accurate approximation of the transmission-oriented process. Furthermore, Eppstein and Hines. [10] put forward a cascading failure simulator (CFS) to model the power dispatch of buses and generators during the propagation of cascading failures. As for the cyber system, the epidemic spreading model was adopted to simulate the propagation of computer malware [11] , [12] . In these studies, the nodes in the cyber system are classified into at least two states, namely, susceptible and infected, and a deterministic or stochastic model to simulate the transitions between different states.
While the robustness of various networked infrastructures has been extensively studied, the focus of most efforts has been on isolated or single networks. However, cyber-physical systems such as smart grids are comprised of two networks dependent on each other. In such interdependent systems, events taking place in one network are likely to have impacts on others. In 2010, Buldyrev et al. introduced the concept of interdependent network and proposed a one-to-one coupling cascading failure model between communication and power networks to explain the 2003 electrical blackout in Italy [13] . In this work, they generated two random graphs and defined a dependency link between every pair of nodes from different networks. They showed that random failures can cascade through the networks and the interdependent networks more vulnerable to random failures compared with the isolated networks. Vespignani [14] studied the robustness and cascading failures in interdependent networks and highlighted the vulnerability of tightly coupled infrastructures and showed the need to consider mutually dependent network properties in designing resilient systems. Following these pioneering works, researchers conducted a number of more in-depth studies on interdependent networks, specifically concerning coupling patterns [15] , [16] , critical node analysis [17] and vulnerability against attacks [18] , [19] .
Much of the existing work on interdependent networks adopts a fairly simplistic model in which two interdependent systems with the same network size are coupled in a one-toone coupling way. However, this assumption is not valid for many real-world cyber-physical systems. To this end, [20] studied the robustness of two interdependent networks with identical degrees of mutually dependent nodes. In [21] , Shao et al. put forward a model in which nodes in one network may depend on more than one nodes in the other network. Moreover, in realistic scenarios, the number of nodes in both layers of a cyber-physical system may be unequal. For example, for the high-voltage electrical network in Italy [22] , the cyber and power networks have 39 and 310 nodes, respectively. Such an imbalance in the number of nodes in the two networks can lead to a more serious cascading failure since the malfunction of a node in the cyber network can directly neutralize 8 power nodes on average. Therefore, for cyber-physical systems of this sort, it is paramount to find a solution to reduce the system vulnerability under cyber failures.
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of smart grids against cyber attacks by modeling the system as an interdependent system consisting of a cyber network and a power network. The mechanism of malfunction propagation in the cyber network (caused by computer malware contagion) and that in the power system (caused by element isolation and power overloading) are considered, with emphasis on the interdependency between the two networks. In order the accurately mimic the realistic scenarios, different from existing work, we assume that the two interdependent networks can have unequal network size, and propose a one-to-k coupling method to improve the robustness of this coupled system against both random and intentional cyber attacks.
In the rest of this paper, we first explain the mechanism of failure spreading in the cyber-physical power system and define a metric to assess the robustness of this system in Section II. In Section III, we propose the robustness metric defined as the power losses and perform a critical node analysis on cyber-physical power systems. Based on the metrics characterizing node importance, in Section IV, we propose several deterministic and stochastic coupling methods and conduct experimental simulations on benchmark datasets to evaluate their performance. Conclusions of this work are given in Section V.
II. NETWORK MODEL
In this paper, we study the cascading failure process in the cyber-physical power system triggered by computer malware. In particular, we consider a model of interdependent networks consisting of two subnetworks: a cyber network and a power grid. In the following, we will describe the basic model of each subnetwork in detail and explain the mechanism of failure spreading between them.
A. CYBER NETWORK MODEL
In modern smart grids, a cyber system for monitoring, control, and communication of the physical grid has been established, where the control centers in the cyber layer work as a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. In the cyber network, each node refers to a control computer and each edge within this network represents an information transmission path between two computers. In this work, we adopt the susceptible-infected (SI) epidemic spreading model to mimic the spreading mechanism of computer malware in the cyber network.
We consider a cyber network G(N , E), where N and E denote the set of nodes and edges, respectively. In the SI model, each node has two possible states: Susceptible (S) and Infected (I). A susceptible node may become infected if its neighbors transmit the computer malware to it. Here, we do not consider the repair and anti-malware actions in a fast failure spreading process, and thus the infected nodes cannot be recovered to a susceptible state. We model the state transition from S to I as a Markov stochastic process, and the VOLUME 7, 2019 probability of this state transmission for node i at time step t is given as
where Nei(i) is the set of neighbors of node i, I (j, t) equals 1 if node j is infected at time t, and 0 otherwise, and v is the rate at which an infected node infects its neighbor. As a kind of local spreading model, the fault propagation of SI model only occurs in the adjacent areas of the susceptible node. Moreover, though unable to work normally, the infected nodes will not be removed from the network. Therefore, different from other cascading failure models such as the percolation model, this cascading process in the SI model will not influence the topological structure of the network. In this model, when a susceptible node is initially infected by a cyber attack, the malfunction spreading will take it as the center and expand outward along the links until all nodes are infected.
B. POWER NETWORK MODEL
Simulating the cascading failure of power systems is a challenging problem, and previous studies have proposed various methods to model the process of power redistribution and overloading [23] - [25] .
In general, cascading outages in a power grid can be modeled as a stochastic process considering overloading and hidden failures. After the initial component malfunction, branches suffering severe power overloading are exposed to higher risks of an outage. Based on these considerations, we adopt a DC-power flow model based cascading failure simulator (DC-CFS) proposed in [10] to analyze the failure process in power systems.
We consider a power network G(N , E), where N and E denote the set of buses and branches, respectively. Each bus in the grid is either a generator, denoted by g ∈ G, or a load, denoted by d ∈ D. We assume that n g = |G|, n d = |D| and
] T as the power generation vector of generators, and
] T as the complex load vector of load. According to the DC power flow approximation, the vector of nodal power injection
T can be expressed as a linear function:
where C g is a sparse n × n g bus-generator incidence matrix whose (i, j) element is defined as 1 if generator j is located at bus i and as 0 otherwise. Similarly, C d is an n × n d bus-load incident matrix. The vector of bus voltage angles
where B bus is a n × n matrix, in which
, and x ij is the branch reactance between buses i and j.
The complex current power flow loading S ij in a branch from bus i to j can be approximated as
After obtaining the power flow of each branch, the tripping rate of the branch between buses i and j at time t can be calculated as
where P ij (t) is the current power loading at time t, α is the basic unit rate of branch tripping, and C ij represents the power flow limit of the branch. In a power grid, malfunction of a network component will change the network topology and induce redistribution of power flow, may leading to overloading of branches or isolation of some components in the system. In this paper, we use the DC power flow model described above to approximate the power flow distribution and perform a cascading failure simulator described as follows to capture the dynamic instability during the cascading outage. The procedure of DC-CFS is described as follows.
Step 1 Initialization: Initialize the status and structure of the power system, and predefine the limitation of generators' output with the given ramping rate γ . The upper limit output S U i and lower limit output S L i of generator i are set as
and
where S max i and S min i are the maximum and minimum capacities of generator bus i, and S G i is the original output of it.
Step 2 Initial Node Tripping: One or several network components are chosen to be tripped and removed from the network.
Step 3 Update Subgrid Status: After the removal of buses or branches, the structure of the power grid is altered, which may end up as several disconnected subgrids. We assume that subgrids with at least one generator and one load bus are workable, and the others will be removed.
Step 4 Power Balance: For each workable subgrid selected in Step 3, we first calculate the total output of all generators S G and the total injection of all loads S D . If an inequality exists between them, move to step 5 to balance the power. Otherwise, move to step 6 to calculate the power flow.
Step 5 Generation and Load Re-dispatch: There are two kinds of scenarios of the re-dispatch process between generators and loads. First, if there is a surplus of generator output, ramp down the output of each generator uniformly until all of them have reached their lower limits. If the total output of generators is still larger than the injection of load buses, the generator will be tripped one by one until S G ≤ S D . Second, if there is a lack of generator output, ramp up the output of each generator until the power regains equilibrium or the output reaches its upper limit, if the output of generators is still less than the injection of load buses, shed load buses one after another until S G ≥ S D . Repeat this step until the power balance is regained.
Step 6 Power Flow Calculation and Overloading Identification: After balancing the power between generator and load buses, calculate the power flow of each branch with the DC power flow model. If the power flow of each branch in a subgrid is no larger than its capacity, the subgrid is in a secured state and finish this simulation. Otherwise, proceed to the next step.
Step 7 Branch Tripping: If there is any overloaded branch, trip one at a time step with a specified probability in proportion to the degree of its overload, as is defined in (5).
C. STOCHASTIC CASCADING FAILURE MECHANISM
The CPPS can be topologically modeled as an interdependent system coupling by a cyber network and a power network. In this paper, each node in the cyber network is considered as an intelligent computer, which can control the operation of power buses and spread computer malware to its neighbors. Each node in a power network is either a generator or a load, both providing power supply to their control nodes. In most realistic cases, the size of the cyber network is much smaller than the power network. This fact indicates that each computer should control multiple components of the power system. The interdependent links between two subnetworks can provide bi-directional interdependency between coupled nodes. Therefore, an initial attack on a cyber node may affect both the cyber and the power network. as follows.
• On the one hand, the cyber attack can infect a cyber node with computer malware. Such an infection can spread through the branches connecting the infected and susceptible nodes and as a result, the computer malware will expand outward along the links until all nodes are infected.
• On the other hand, an infected computer may send erroneous signals to the power buses it controls through the interdependent links and possibly breaking them down. After the removal of certain buses, the power system will be divided into some subgrids. Power re-dispatch will take place in each subgrid, possibly leading to the overload of branches and cascading failures in the power system.
In most previous studies, the nodes or links will be removed from the network immediately once they become overloaded. In reality, however, there is usually a latent period before these overloaded components eventually lose their functions, and the time duration of this period will decrease with the degree of overloading increasing. Therefore, we adopt a stochastic model illustrated in Fig. 1 to simulate the dynamic process of cascading failure in CPPSs.
Step 1 Initialize System: Initialize the structure of the cyber network, the power network, and the coupling links between them. Ensure that each bus of power network should be related to at least one control node in cyber network. Before the simulation of cascading failure, the initial demand of load buses, the output threshold of generators and the capacities of branches are initialized according to the dataset for power network.
The strength of malware spread is given as well.
Step 2 Launch Initial Cyber Failure: In this study, we consider the process of cascading failure in CPPSs caused by cyber malware attacks. Thus, the initial trigger of the cascading failure is the launching of a malware in the cyber network. The time of launching cyber malware is set as 0.
Step 3 Update Network Statuses: Update the statuses of both networks after the failure in the previous step.
In this work, we remove the power buses which are not controlled by any computer, along with the cyber nodes without power supply. If the power system are separated into multiple subgrids, we detect the functional subgrids and calculate the real power flow of each branch (Details are given in Section II-B).
Step 4 Detect Components in Risk: The overloading branches, the susceptible nodes adjacent to an infected one, and the buses having an interdependent link with an infected cyber node are considered as components in risk. If no components are in risk, terminate this simulation process. Otherwise, collect them into a list and proceed to the next step.
Step 5 Determine the Location and Time of the Next Failure: Let R(t) = [r 1 (t), r 2 (t), · · · , r n (t)] denote the failure list where r i (t) is the failure rate of unit i at time t. For a stochastic model, each unit is possible to be selected according to its failure rate. Assume there are n units in risk at time t, and the probability for unit j to be selected as the next failure P s j can be written as
Note that at most one unit will be selected at a time, and the total cascading failure process can be expressed as a sequence.
To determine the time of the next failure, we need to obtain the time interval between two successive failures. Suppose Q(τ ) is the probability that no unit is broken down in time interval (t, t + τ ). According to the results given in [26] , Q(τ + t) can be written as
Taking t close to 0 and solving the differential equation, we can obtain
Here we have Q(0) = 1 because the probability that no failure happens in zero time is one, and thus the probability F(τ ) that a unit fails between (t, t + τ ) can be written as
To simulate the stochastic failure process, we can generate a random number z uniformly between 0 and 1 to represent the value of F(τ ). As a result, the time duration τ can be calculated as
III. CRITICAL NODE ANALYSIS A. ROBUSTNESS METRIC
The robustness of a system represents its capability to cope with internal faults or external attacks. In much of previous work, the robustness of a network is defined as the ratio of the size of the giant connected component after cascading failure to that of the original network. However, such metric only focus on the underlying topology of a network and cannot characterize the functional performance of the CPPS discussed here. What is more, some small-size connected subgrids consisting of both generators and loads may still be functioning. In order to measure the impact of cascading failure on CPPSs, we define the percentage of power loss (PL) at time t as follows.
where G is the set of generators in the power grid before cascading failures, S G (b) is the initial power generation of bus b, G t is the set of generators in the power grid at current time t, and S G t (b) is the current power generation of bus b at time t.
With a fixed time internal t, a small PL(t) means that the network can keep most of its function within this time.
For a modern power grid, it is deemed to be a large blackout if the power loss exceeds a certain threshold, and the average time required for the blackout of a power system can be another measure for its robustness, with a long time indicating better robustness against the attack.
B. CRITICAL NODE ANALYSIS
As mentioned in many previous studies, the coupling manner of an interdependent network have great impact on the robustness of the whole system. For example, Parshani et al. [16] suggest that the interdependent networks are more robust if coupling links are added between the nodes with similar centrality.
Here, in order the explore the coupling strategy for the CPPS, we first conduct a critical node analysis to identify the vital nodes from the perspective of system robustness. In previous studies, degree and betweenness are the most commonly used properties to quantify the importance of nodes in cyber networks. According to the analysis of node surviving probability in scale-free network [27] , under the SI model, the infection speed of a node is positively correlated to its degree. As mentioned in Section II, in this work, we adopt the SI model to mimic the spreading of computer malware in the cyber network. Thus here we use node degree to quantify the importance of a cyber node. However, when it comes to the cascading simulation of power system, power buses with high degree or load may not always be the most influential network components.
Different from the traditional parameters which consider only the static properties of power buses, in this paper, we propose two kinds of dynamic methods to measure the importance of power buses in a power grid, namely, node destructiveness and node vulnerability.
Intuitively, if the removal of a node triggers a large-scale destruction, it can be regarded as an influential component of this system. Thus, we define the node destructiveness ND(i) of bus i as the percentage of power loss when it is removed from the power system.
Similarly, we consider a bus to be vulnerable if it breaks down easily with the removal of other buses. Therefore, let NV (i) be the vulnerability of bus i, which is defined as the survival rate of this bus in the cascading failure process.
where N 0 /i is the set of power buses except i, and suv(i, b) is 1 if bus b survives in the whole cascading failure process lead by the failure of bus i, and 0 otherwise. Then we define the overall dynamic importance parameter NI (i) of each power node i as a linear combination of node destructiveness and vulnerability, i.e.,
where ω is a linear weight varying from 0 to 1. In addition of the dynamic importance parameter described above, we also consider the degree centrality and power load to quantify the importance of each node in the power network.
IV. COUPLING STRATEGIES A. DETERMINISTIC COUPLING STRATEGIES
In this work, we consider the one-to-k coupling manner in a CPPS where two network layers have unequal network sizes. According to empirical studies about realistic CPPSs, the number of power nodes are usually much larger than that of the cyber nodes. For example, according to [22] , a highvoltage electrical network in Italy contains 39 cyber nodes and 310 power nodes. To this end, here we set the number of power nodes as n and the number of cyber nodes as pn (0 < p < 1). For such an asymmetric interdependent system, we assume that the each power bus is controlled by k communication nodes, and each cyber node has to couple with m = k/p power buses.
Inspired by one-to-one coupling strategies proposed in prior work, we introduce three kinds of deterministic coupling ways as follows:
• Assortative Coupling(AS): Sort the cyber nodes and power nodes in descending order of the selected node importance metrics. Connect the first cyber node with the first m (ranked between 1 st and m th ) power nodes, and then connect the second cyber node with power buses ranked (
, and so on. Repeat the operation until all the cyber nodes are coupled. Note that here we consider the degree centrality to evaluate the importance of a cyber node, and three metrics, namely, degree centrality, power load and dynamic importance, to rank the power nodes. In this way, we have three kinds of assortative coupling ways, namely, Degree to Degree Assortative Coupling (DD_AS), Degree to Load Assortative Coupling (DL_AS), and Degree to Dynamic Importance Assortative Coupling (DI_AS).
• Disassortative coupling(DIS): Sort the cyber nodes and power nodes in ascending and descending order of the selected node importance metrics, respectively. Connect the first cyber node with the first m (ranked between 1 st and m th ) power nodes, and then connect the second cyber node with power buses ranked (
, and so on.
Repeat the operation until all the cyber nodes are coupled. Similar to the assortative coupling, we also have three kinds of disassortative coupling ways, namely, Degree to Degree Disassortative Coupling (DD_DIS), Degree to Load Disassortative Coupling (DL_DIS), and Degree to Dynamic Importance Disassortative Coupling (DI_DIS).
• Random coupling(RD): Randomly sort the cyber and power nodes, and add connect them according to the way described above. The process of building a CPPS are given as follows. We first build the power network using the IEEE 118 Bus and 300 Bus test cases. The topology of the IEEE 118 Bus system is given in Fig. 2 , and the topological properties of IEEE 118 Bus and 300 Bus are listed in Table 1 . For a power network with n nodes, we adopt the Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free model to generate the corresponding cyber network with pn nodes. Here we set p = 0.1 and the infected rate for cyber nodes v = 0.1. For the power network, we set the ramp rate γ of the generators as 0.3 and the basic failure unit of each branch as 1.
In this work, we investigate the robustness of a CPPS under both random and intentional cyber attacks. Here we simulate a random or intentional cyber attack by infecting a randomly chosen cyber node or the node with highest degree, respectively. In the simulations, to evaluate the system robustness, we calculated the time duration from the initial failure to the time when the PL(t) reaches 0.2. For the random case, we repeat simulations for 300 times and calculate the average value as results.
We first explore the most appropriate value of the weight parameter ω for the metric of dynamic importance. For the CPPS built on IEEE 118 Bus, we can observe from Fig. 3 that the DI_AS achieves the best performance when we set ω = 0, while the DI_DIS performs best when the ω is around 0.6 and 0.5 for the scenarios of random and intentional attacks, respectively. As shown in Fig. 4 , for the case of IEEE 300 Bus, the DI_DIS strategy with an ω close to 0.3 or 0.9 can better improve the robustness of power network, and the DI_AS strategy achieves best performance with ω somewhere in between. In following simulations, we select the best weight ω observed in Figs. 3 and 4 to design the coupling methods under different scenarios.
Figs. 5 and 6 compare seven kinds of coupling strategies with different number of coupling links for the CPPS built on IEEE 118 Bus and 300 Bus, respectively. We can conclude from the results that the coupling methods DI_AS and DI_DIS outperform other five methods, especially for the dense coupling with a high value of k. In other words, both the assortative and disassortative coupling methods achieve their best performance when the power buses are ranked in the proposed dynamic importance metric. This result indicates that, the node destructiveness and vulnerability can effectively reflect the importance of power buses under cascading failures triggered by cyber attacks, and the whole system will be more robust if we increase the number of control nodes for each power bus irrespective of the specific coupling strategy used.
What is more, we find that the disassortative coupling method always has a better performance than the assortative coupling method for each sorting metric. This result indicates that connecting the important buses in power network with the low degree nodes in cyber network, which are relatively less likely to be affected by computer malwares, can improve the robustness of power system under random and intentional cyber attacks. It is also worth mentioning that, the random coupling(RD) method is better than some degree-degree(DD) and degree-load(DL) methods, which indicates that coupling a cyber node with the power buses with consecutive rankings deterministically may not always be a good choice.
B. STOCHASTIC COUPLING STRATEGY
In Section IV-A, we compare six deterministic coupling strategies with a random strategy, and find that the random one performs better than the assortative and disassortative deterministic methods when both the cyber and power buses are ranked by degree. Therefore, in the following, we consider a stochastic coupling strategies by combining both randomness and some particular coupling preferences. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 7. Performance comparisons of the stochastic coupling strategy with different value of ω for the cyber-physical power system built on (a) IEEE 118 Bus, and (b) IEEE 300 Bus.
We first consider the factors of node destructiveness and vulnerability. Intuitively, the power buses with high node destructiveness can easily trigger a serious blackout if they break down. On the other hand, the buses are prone to failure in the process if they are vulnerable. Referring to the simulation results discussed above, these two factors should be taken into consideration for design of a robust CPPS.
However, instead of ranking the cyber nodes based on degree centrality and coupling each of them with consecutively important buses, here we consider a roulette-wheel selection algorithm to select the control nodes for each power bus. The probability P(i) for a cyber node i to be chosen in each round of selection is defined as
where w(i) is the selection weight of node i and N C is the set of all cyber nodes. Here the selection weight w(i) of node i is given as
In this equation, µ i and β i can be regarded as linear and exponential impact factors of the selection weight, respectively. As discussed above, we can improve the robustness of a CPPS by coupling the important power buses with the ''safer'' cyber nodes. According to the analysis of SI model in [27] , a node with higher degree is usually more likely to be infected and the inverse of the infection probability of a node is linearly correlated with the inverse of its degree. Here in this work, cyber nodes with a lower degree are more robust in the spreading process of computer malwares and coupling the important buses with them tends to slow down the failure in the power network. Therefore, the linear factor µ i in 17 can be defined as
where Deg(i) is the degree of the cyber node i. However, if we only consider the above linear factor for node selection, some low degree nodes may couple with a extremely large number of power buses and thus attacks on such nodes will lead a serious blackout in a short time.
To regulate the chosen probability of the cyber nodes which have already been chosen for many times, we design a weight-reduction method by consider the following exponential factor, i.e.,
where ρ is the ratio of cyber node number to power node number, k is the number of control node per power bus, N P is the set of power buses, and Link(i, b) equals 1 if there exists a coupling link between cyber node i and power bus b, and 0 otherwise. In this way, the exponential factor e β(i) in (16) can reduce the chosen weight of a node with a number of coupling links already. Therefore, combining (16) to (19), we have
Similar to DI_DIS and DI_AS deterministic strategies, the stochastic strategy is also influenced by the value of ω in (15) . According to the results in Fig. 7 , for the case of IEEE 118 Bus, we set ω as 0.7 and 0.6 under random and intentional attacks, respectively. While for the IEEE 300 Bus, we set ω as 0.9 and 0.7 under random and intentional attacks, respectively.
With a proper selection of ω, in the following, we compare the performance of the stochastic strategy with disassortative strategies with different sorting rules of power buses. By setting all parameters the same as that in Section IV-A, Figs. 8 and 9 compare the performance of stochastic method, denoted by DI_S with other deterministic coupling methods for the CPPS built on IEEE 118 Bus and 300 Bus, respectively.
We can observe that, the stochastic strategy DI_S performs much better than the three deterministic coupling strategies, and the superiority is more obvious in the case of IEEE 300 Bus System. This result indicates that, as the dynamic importance metric proposed in this paper can reflect which power buses worth being protected, coupling the important FIGURE 8. Performance comparisons of the stochastic coupling strategy (DI_S) with deterministic coupling strategies for the for the cyber-physical power system built on IEEE 118 Bus. The cascading failure process is initialized by (a) random cyber attack, and (b) intentional cyber attack.
FIGURE 9.
Performance comparisons of the stochastic coupling strategy (DI_S) with deterministic coupling strategies for the for the cyber-physical power system built on IEEE 300 Bus. The cascading failure process is initialized by (a) random cyber attack, and (b) intentional cyber attack.
buses with the low-degree cyber nodes is an effective way to avoid large blackouts of power network. What is more, coupling the power buses with the cyber nodes with a stochastic strategy can prominently improve the robustness of CPPS compared with the deterministic one, because it avoids the situation that the most important power buses are simultaneously endangered with the removal of one cyber node.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern smart grids can be regarded as typical cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs), in which the physical layer is the electrical apparatus in the power system and the cyber layer work are computers for communications, control, and monitoring of the physical layer. The coupling manner of the power network with cyber network will have a significant impact on the safe and reliable operation of CPPSs. Besides, most CPPSs are asymmetric interdependent systems where two subnetworks have unequal network sizes. This paper presented a novel model to investigate the cascading failure process in CPPSs triggered by cyber malware attacks. We proposed a novel parameter to characterize the dynamic importance of each power node and conducted the analysis of critical nodes in the power network to determine the important buses whose removal will likely cause a serious blackout. Then we designed both deterministic and stochastic coupling methods for the asymmetric CPPS, the purpose being to enhance its robustness against cyber attacks. Simulation results on two asymmetric CPPS cases built on IEEE 118 Bus and 300 Bus demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic importance metric as well as the coupling methods. For future work, we plan to consider reinforcement learning and evolutionary computing to design coupling strategies with more stable performance.
